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Executive Summary 
 
Biological incidents, both man-made and naturally occurring, represent a significant 
threat to the national security of the United States. Identifying these crises begins with the 
detection and reporting of essential biological disease information, known as biosurveillance. As 
the first of its kind, the 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance targets the process essential 
information should take to reach decisionmakers. Although there are points of strength in the 
system, extensive research finds the current biosurveillance infrastructure does not adequately 
transmit information to decisionmakers. Therefore, this report recommends three improvements 
to the biosurveillance system: increase incorporation of information, improve interagency 
relationships, and strengthen governance in the biosurveillance community. 
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Acronyms 
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Introduction 
 
Biological incidents, both man-made and naturally occurring, represent a significant 
threat to the national security of the United States. Identifying these crises begins with the 
detection and reporting of essential biological disease information, known as biosurveillance. In 
2012, the first National Strategy for Biosurveillance was produced to respond to this threat. The 
Strategy’s goal is “to achieve a well-integrated national biosurveillance enterprise that saves 
lives by providing essential information for better decisionmaking at all levels.”1 This report 
examines the Strategy, evaluates its implementation, and recommends policies for improving the 
national biosurveillance infrastructure. 
This report asks: Is the current approach for the National Strategy for Biosurveillance 
(July 2012) conducive to meeting its desired endstate? If not, where does it need adjustment? It 
finds that the Strategy is ineffective in reaching its desired goal. At present, the Strategy does not 
have guidelines to provide complete situational awareness for decisionmakers in a timely fashion. 
Moreover, the Strategy’s ambiguity inhibits cohesive implementation throughout the community. 
Given the current environment, this report targets data incorporation, relationships, and 
governance, offering recommendations to improve each area and to align the community with 
the Strategy’s goal. This report first details its analytical framework and methodology. It then 
evaluates the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. Subsequently, it discusses the strengths and 
concerns in the biosurveillance system. Finally, the report provides its recommendations to 
address the areas of concern. 
 
Framework 
 
Scope 
In order to address the research questions, this report constructed a framework including facts, 
assumptions, and research boundaries. The research group conducted its research applying four 
facts. First, private entities contribute a large portion of biosurveillance data. Second, the 
                                                        
1 Executive Office of the President, The White House, National Strategy for Biosurveillance, (Washington, D.C., 2012), 
1. 
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findings of the 9/11 Commission that established NBIC is still in force.
2
 Third, no single federal 
point of contact for biosurveillance exists. Fourth, the biosurveillance threat environment is 
complex and unstable while the reporting environment is simple and stable. The single 
assumption used is that the practice of scanning and discerning the environment does not 
fundamentally change during a bio-event. 
For the purposes of this report, the biosurveillance community is defined as the individuals 
and agencies involved in biosurveillance. The biosurveillance infrastructure references the 
stovepipes through which these individuals and agencies work. Finally, the biosurveillance 
system is an overarching term including both the infrastructure and the community. 
This research was limited by the definition of biosurveillance stated in the Strategy as, “the 
process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating essential information related 
to all-hazards threats or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant health to achieve early 
detection and warning, contribute to overall situational awareness of the health aspects of an 
incident, and to enable better decisionmaking at all levels.”3 The research parameters were 
further bounded in four ways due to limited resources of time and expertise. First, the research 
targeted surveillance efforts, defined as the ongoing collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
pathogen-related data. Actions taken in response to these efforts are separate from 
biosurveillance and were not examined. Next, evaluation focused on federal biosurveillance 
infrastructure and its interaction with state, local, and tribal entities. International, state-to-state, 
local-to-state, and other non-federal biosurveillance interactions were outside the scope of this 
research question. Third, this report accepted the current fiscal environment and did not attempt 
to alter it. Finally, the efficacy of biosurveillance’s underlying components, including subject 
matter experts and technical surveillance systems, were not examined.  
 
Methodology 
This report followed a four-step research process to evaluate the Strategy and its 
implementation. First, researchers conducted a comprehensive literature review including 
academic reports, government documents, and organization theory. This established an 
                                                        
2 “The Secretary shall establish, operate, and maintain a National Biosurveillance Integration Center (referred to in this 
section as the ‘NBIC’), which shall be headed by a Directing Officer, under an office or directorate of the Department that is in 
existence as of the date of the enactment of this section.” (Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, Pub. 
L. No. 110—53, 121 Stat. 375-380, § 316 (2007).) 
3 National Strategy for Biosurveillance, 2-3. 
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understanding of the United States’ current biosurveillance community and infrastructure. 
Through this process, the research team developed a biosurveillance organization chart, 
identifying key players, information flows, and integration centers.  
Second, the literature review produced sources for an extensive interview campaign. The 
campaign targeted current and former biosurveillance stakeholders and subject matter experts. 
Over 50 interviews provided a nuanced picture of the state of the biosurveillance community. 
The process incorporated perspectives from academia, commercial interests, state and local 
officials, and senior executives at the federal level.
4
 This information was used to revise the 
biosurveillance organization chart. Many interviewees were very candid and provided useful 
information; however, some did not want to be cited by name given the current political 
environment. Consequently, several interviews are cited only on background.  
Third, the four core functions within the Strategy were used to evaluate the information 
collected.
5
 Using this framework, the research team identified strengths and concerns within the 
biosurveillance community. These core functions guided the evaluation of the Strategy and 
influenced the recommendations for improving national biosurveillance efforts. During this 
process, the research team used an ends, ways, and means analysis to examine the Strategy’s 
ways to determine if they were sufficient to meet its endstate. The means were a consistent 
variable based on the current budget. The Strategy’s goal was evaluated as its endstate and was 
also a constant. Policy documents such as the Strategy generally outline the ways to reach the 
endstate; therefore, this research focused on analyzing the ways. 
Finally, the research team identified key strengths and concerns and grouped them 
thematically under data, relationships, and governance. This led to the development of 
recommendations to address identified concerns within each category.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 The following organizations declined to participate in the interview process: Congress, the Departments of Commerce, 
Veterans Affairs, State, Justice, Labor, and Transportation, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the General Services 
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, the Social Security Administration, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, and the US Postal Service.  
5 The four functions for national biosurveillance identified in the Strategy are scan and discern the environment, 
identify and integrate essential information, alert and inform decisionmakers, and forecast and advise impacts. (National Strategy 
for Biosurveillance, 5-6.) 
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Evaluating the National Strategy for Biosurveillance 
 
The Strategy clearly outlines a common definition for biosurveillance and a common goal, 
which creates the first cohesive framework for biosurveillance. While the Strategy provides a 
clear endstate and assumes constant means, it neglects to clarify or explain the ways necessary to 
achieve that endstate. The Strategy’s ambiguity has not resolved inherent problems with data 
incorporation, weak relationships, and poor governance. These unresolved issues exacerbate 
existing stovepiping and prevent implementation of the Strategy’s desired endstate. Although the 
corresponding Implementation Plan was produced in 2013, it has not been widely disseminated 
to the biosurveillance community and therefore remains ineffective in clarifying the ways to 
achieve the endstate.
6
 
The Strategy focuses on four core functions that frame the main operations of effective 
biosurveillance. Ideally, to improve the system, the ways would target these four functions, yet 
the ways do not exist. The Strategy’s call for integrating capabilities, building capacity, fostering 
innovation, and strengthening partnerships remain injunctions lacking a framework for 
evaluation. Additionally, the Strategy lacks a structure to identify challenges and to prioritize and 
allocate resources across the government. These weaknesses make effective implementation 
difficult. 
 
Strengths and Concerns 
 
Data Incorporation 
The biosurveillance community analyzes massive amounts of data on a regular basis. 
Experts within agencies provide effective specialized analysis. An abundance of data streams 
exist; however, some data sources remain underutilized. The community faces many 
opportunities to expand data incorporation.  
The current method of data collection and dissemination hinders biosurveillance 
integration, as agencies are unsure of their reporting responsibilities. Human and animal health 
programs are often unable to coordinate because the two data flows focus on different diseases, 
                                                        
6 Implementation Plan National Strategy for Biosurveillance. 
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with limited interoperability between agencies.
7
 Without a dedicated analytical effort to bridge 
the two subjects, increased sharing may not yield better analysis. As an important method to 
bridge this gap, several biosurveillance stakeholders noted the importance of identifying and 
prioritizing pathogens of interest for all biosurveillance agencies.
8
 Furthermore, the lack of 
standards for both data verification and confidentiality concerns impedes sharing between 
agencies, even when interests otherwise align. Lastly, at the federal level, agencies struggle to 
effectively communicate their combined findings to policymakers. In sum, while data collection 
remains sufficient, dissemination and incorporation of that data into analyzed products for 
reporting remains problematic. 
In the plant and animal community, fears regarding the lack of confidentiality measures 
impede sharing. Without existing standards for data protection, many individuals withhold 
information from the biosurveillance community due to the possible adverse economic impacts.
9
 
For instance, farmers and ranchers may choose to withhold information about the health of their 
livestock due to concerns that the government will misuse the information or it will leak to the 
press.
10
 Potential consequences include drastic reactions, such as slaughtering livestock. These 
commercial concerns represent an area in need of improvement, particularly regarding plant and 
animal biosurveillance. 
The lack of universal standards for confidentiality also impedes data incorporation in 
human surveillance. According to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) members, authorities and processes exist within DHS to protect 
personal information; however, the historical unwillingness to share hurts transparency and 
creates a cycle of distrust between stakeholders.
11
 For example, the non-universal standards of 
electronic health records (EHRs) impede the flow of biosurveillance. If the biosurveillance 
community suggested creating a universal record, some stakeholders believe Congress would not 
permit its implementation because of possible violations to patient privacy.
12
 The clash between 
                                                        
7 IOM (Institute of Medicine), 2012, Information sharing and collaboration: Applications to integrated 
biosurveillance: Workshop summary, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.), 14-15. 
8 Department of Homeland Security, National Biosurveillance Integration Center, National Biosurveillance Integration 
Center Strategic Plan, (2012), 15.; Greg Koblentz, PhD. (George Mason University Biodefense Program), interviewed by 
Lodrick Williams. 
9 Interview with federal government employee, February 25, 2014. 
10 Marty Venier, PhD. (Emergency Response Coordinator, USDA), interviewed by Jose Paulino.; Mark Teachmann 
(Director of Interagency Coordination, USDA), interviewed by Lodrick Williams. 
11 Interview with former federal government employee, April 1, 2014.; Interview with federal government employee, 
February 26, 2014. 
12 Interview with former military officer, March 3, 2014. 
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civil liberties and the misuse of information from the system result in the potential for abuse.
13
 
Health information amassed from medical records via hospital visits and prescriptions lacks a 
standard to ensure anonymity and protection, decreasing its utility. 
In order to use data effectively, stakeholders need expertise to interpret and verify 
information received. Analysts are reluctant to share information for fear that misinterpreted 
results will generate false reports.
14
 The lack of widespread expertise among policymakers 
represents another area for potential misinterpretation of information. Raw data requires subject 
matter experts for analysis; however, as information progresses through the decision chain, 
policy experts replace subject matter experts. As one public health specialist notes, politics at the 
executive level remain the largest impediment to communication lines. As information moves up 
the decision chain, it becomes too filtered and decisionmakers lose sight of the implications of 
the information they receive.
15
 Decisionmakers lack both a familiarity with the technical analysis 
and established procedures for receiving information.
16
 These communication difficulties 
between the experts and the policy makers inhibit data integration and effective reporting. 
 
Relationships 
 Relationships amongst some biosurveillance stakeholders function well and continue to 
show promise in key areas. Though the wider biosurveillance community struggles with 
communicating and integrating data, specific established partnerships integrate information and 
produce high-quality analyzed products for dissemination outside their agency. However, 
agencies do not participate in these partnership activities at sufficient levels to overcome 
stovepiping. With respect to human health, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established a 
strong relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) through liaison programs and 
interagency working groups.
17
 Similarly, the USDA and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) coordinate on animal health and food supply issues.
18
 Across the community, 
biosurveillance agencies developed necessary infrastructure and expertise to receive data from 
their state and local partners. Some stakeholders criticize these agencies for their high degree of 
                                                        
13 Michael Cohen, M.D. (Head of Brazos Valley Pathology), interviewed by Rebekah Redden.; Kim Dubose 
(Microbiology lab director at Brazos Valley Pathology), interviewed by Rebekah Redden. 
14 Mark Teachmann (Director of Interagency Coordination, USDA), interviewed by Lodrick Williams. 
15 Interview with public health specialist, March 5, 2014. 
16 Information Sharing and Collaboration. 21. 
17 Interview with military officer, March 7, 2014. 
18 Interview with federal government employee, March 6, 2014. 
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specialization and inability to communicate with other disciplines; however, the expertise 
contributes to effective analysis within the agencies.
19
 
Lack of trust between agencies inhibits the functioning of formal relationships and the 
forming of informal ones. One manifestation of distrust revolves around the lack of a mandate to 
share information. Absent formal sharing agreements, transferring data depends on trust and 
relationships, which have been historically insufficient. Many agencies distrust the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), within DHS, which is designed to function as the 
country’s integration hub.20 They feel that NBIC has not functioned as the intended integration 
hub. NBIC shares some information across agencies and coordinates reasonably well with some 
partners, but the value added from NBIC is not clear.
21
 Consequently, agencies resist sharing 
data with DHS, not trusting it to use their information effectively.  
With each agency assessed on whether it completes its mission, there exists little 
incentive to help another agency with its analysis. Agency culture contributes to a pervasive lack 
of trust and sharing within the biosurveillance community. As one public health specialist 
declares, “When sharing data is not on the checklist an organization is graded on, then an 
organization will not do it.”22 Additionally, agencies use different levels of confirmation for 
analyzed data.
23
 Operating with unverified data diminishes the utility of sharing and lessens trust 
in data received from other agencies. Also, agencies maintain a large degree of pride over 
internal products.
24
 Job evaluations and promotions remain based on internal products and 
performance, not on successful communication among agencies. This leads to an absence of 
reliable communication channels, as neither rules nor authority compel people to share. To 
combat this problem, some stakeholders advocate creating more informal channels of 
communication.
25 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 Interview with federal government employee, March 26, 2014. 
20 Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, Pub. L. No. 110—53, 121 Stat. 375-380, § 316 (2007). 
21 Interview with public health specialist, March 5, 2014.; Interview with senior federal government official, March 20, 
2014. 
22 Interview with public health specialist, March 3, 2014. 
23 Interview with senior federal government official, February 28, 2014. 
24 Interview with senior federal government official, March 20, 2014. 
25 Ibid. 
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Governance and Leadership 
 Federal biosurveillance agencies communicate effectively with their state and local 
counterparts and operate several successful interagency groups. Where well-established vertical 
flows of information and authority exist, individuals and agencies generally meet their 
responsibilities. State and local authorities collect most biosurveillance data, which becomes 
integrated at the federal level. Vertical lines of communication between states and the federal 
government operate well within stovepipes.
26
 For example, state health departments provide the 
bulk of human health data, communicating raw data and analyzed information up the chain of 
command because of well-established relations with the CDC.
27
 The Integrated Consortium of 
Laboratory Networks (ICLN), a collection of public health laboratories at the local, state, and 
federal level, successfully organizes laboratories with different areas of expertise to participate in 
biosurveillance efforts. It operates under a well-delineated set of responsibilities and 
communication protocols.
28
 Other laboratory networks such as those contributing to the ICLN 
have similar success at integrating human and animal biosurveillance data due to a strong chain 
of command and good governance.
29
 
As alluded to previously, the most common criticism leveled at the federal 
biosurveillance system is also the most general: agencies fail to communicate with each other. 
Each agency works within its own area of expertise without contributing to general situational 
awareness. The biosurveillance infrastructure’s decentralized structure and lack of a strong 
overall leader lead to ambiguity in responsibilities.
30
 Integration centers demonstrate these 
difficulties. Biosurveillance coordination efforts operating through integration centers yield 
mixed results since their implementation. In 2007, Congress mandated the creation of NBIC with 
the mission to aggregate data from the biosurveillance community and to serve as a central 
analysis hub.
31
 Since its inception NBIC struggled to fulfill its role as an integration center due to 
personnel issues, resource constraints, and interagency politics.
32
 Recently, NBIC has established 
                                                        
26 Kim Dubose (Microbiology lab director at Brazos Valley Pathology), interviewed by Rebekah Redden. 
27 Interview with public health specialist, March 6, 2014. 
28 Interview with military officer, March 14, 2014.; Greg Koblentz, PhD. (George Mason University Biodefense 
Program), interviewed by Lodrick Williams.; ICLN Portal. https://www.icln.org/.; Scott Becker, PhD. (Executive Director of the 
Association of Public Health Labs), interviewed by Alex Bitter. 
29 Interview with federal government employee, March 10, 2014. 
30 Interview with biosurveillance expert, March 7, 2014. 
31 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, § 316 (2007). 
32 United States Government Accountability Office, Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Strategy Need a 
National Strategy and a Designated Leader, by William Jenkins, GAO-10-645 (Washington D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2010), 27. 
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clearer lines of communication between it and its partner agencies as it reconfigures its mission, 
yet there remains room for improvement.
33
 
NBIC did not attract analysts from its partner agencies, preventing it from serving as a 
forum for subject matter experts from across the community. As originally intended, it would be 
able to tap into structured but unanalyzed data received from its partners in order to formulate an 
independent biosurveillance assessment.
34
 Due to NBIC’s limited budget and its liaison analysts 
serving at the pleasure of their departments, the Center lacks sufficient subject matter experts. 
Furthermore, its partners consistently supply NBIC with their final reports, rather than the raw 
data that NBIC analysts need to formulate their own analyses. As a result, NBIC reports have not 
been timely, hindering its ability to serve as intended.
35
 Consequently, agencies remain confused 
about the utility of NBIC’s products.36 With its expansive mission NBIC cannot make the 
investments necessary to carry out its mission.
37
 Government employees associated with NBIC 
indicate that Congress should reexamine NBIC’s mission to determine if it is being adequately 
supported.
38
 Furthermore, NBIC has also failed to integrate information from a number of 
preexisting integration centers.
39
 As indicated in the organization chart in Appendix 2, none of 
the biosurveillance interagency integration centers link to NBIC.  
To function as intended and receive data for its analysis, NBIC needs trust from its 
partners. Several government officials think that NBIC became operational too quickly, not 
allowing them the time to build the trust and the connections needed for effective operation.
40
 As 
a result, NBIC became unable to attract staff for liaison programs even when it possessed the 
means to support them.
41
 Furthermore, its initial approach of demanding both data flows and 
support from its partners with tenuous legal backing discouraged cooperation.
42
 This situation 
decreased its capabilities, and NBIC attracted bureaucratic enemies from competition for limited 
                                                        
33 Interview with senior federal government official, March 27, 2014. 
34 Information Sharing and Collaboration, 50. 
35 Ibid, 59. 
36 United States Government Accountability Office, Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering 
Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, by Williams Jenkins, GAO-10-171 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2009), 21-22. 
37 Interview with federal government employee, March 10, 2014. 
38 Interview with senior federal government official, March 27, 2014. 
39 United States Government Accountability Office, An Overall Strategy is Needed to Strengthen Disease Surveillance 
in Livestock and Poultry, by Daniel Garcia-Diaz, GAO 13-424 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
2013), 23-24. 
40 Mark Teachmann (Director of Interagency Coordination, USDA), interviewed by Lodrick Williams. 
41 Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, 22. 
42 Information Sharing and Collaboration. 28-29. 
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resources.
43
 NBIC recently made significant inroads with its partners, signing a formal charter 
delineating roles and responsibilities. However, it still has difficulty securing the memorandums 
of understanding (MOUs) or policy agreements needed for specific information sharing 
agreements among agencies.
44
 
In conclusion, the federal community fails to effectively identify, analyze, and 
communicate biosurveillance information despite adequate support from state and local partners. 
Until the interagency flow of data is improved by repairing relations and enacting a better system 
of governance, the biosurveillance community will not fulfill the goals laid out in the Strategy. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Improving Biosurveillance Data Incorporation 
Although in recent years interoperability of human health records among medical entities 
has improved, more can be done to facilitate the flow of this information to the biosurveillance 
community. Additionally, there are insufficient safeguards for plant and animal-related data 
shared with the biosurveillance community. Together these two concerns lead to incomplete 
situational awareness. 
 
Recommendation: Standardize Human Health Records 
 To improve the acquisition of human health data to the biosurveillance community, all 
EHRs should be standardized. Standardization should adhere to current privacy requirements, 
reassuring healthcare providers their patients’ privacy is maintained. The same standards should 
be used for public and private health entities. A working group should be established by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement standardized EHRs. 
 Current legislation remains inadequate to create interoperable medical records between 
clinical healthcare and governmental agencies. Legislation such as the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act and the Electronic Health Record 
Incentive Program offer monetary incentives to hospitals and health professionals to transition to 
EHRs. Congress mandated the development of the “meaningful use” of interoperable EHR 
                                                        
43 Greg Koblentz, PhD. (George Mason University Biodefense Program), interviewed by Lodrick Williams. 
44 Interview with senior federal government official, March 27, 2014.; National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
Strategic Plan, 46-47. 
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technology.
45
 However, this legislation focuses on information sharing within public health, not 
sharing between clinical healthcare and public health.
46
 Therefore, the meaningful use and 
incentive programs legislation should be expanded to mandate EHRs and electronic laboratory 
reporting (ELR) become interoperable with each other as well as with government software. 
Specifically, state health departments should be added to EHR incentive programs. This would 
increase the flow of data between clinical healthcare and public health.  
 Obstacles exist to introducing new reporting systems into biosurveillance data streams. 
Thus, to resolve interoperability issues, it would be best to expand the scope of existing 
systems.
47
 For example, healthcare facilities already report patient data to insurance companies 
for reimbursement. This data is required to be more detailed and expansive than requirements 
from state health departments. The biosurveillance community has yet to take advantage of this 
novel data stream. By using the existing insurance coding system, the amount of healthcare data 
collected could be expanded without increasing the administration costs of healthcare. Therefore, 
the biosurveillance community could increase the volume of its aggregate medical data to an 
extent previously unobtainable.
48
 An agreement should be created between insurance companies 
and federal biosurveillance consumers that ensures patient anonymity and the fast transmission 
of this data. 
 
Recommendation: Protect Plant, Animal, and Environment-Related Commercial Interests 
 At present, the amount of data collected from commercial contributors, such as farmers, 
ranchers, and environmental observers, needs to increase. Thus, legislation should be drafted 
with coordination from the USDA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to protect 
the anonymity of commercial contributors’ data. This legislation would prevent a particular farm, 
ranch, or location from being identified by the contributed information, even if the shared data 
were leaked or prematurely released to the public. Contributors will be more inclined to report 
potential diseases if they are assured it will not negatively impact their commercial interests. 
 
                                                        
45 Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare and Medicaid 
Programs: Electronic Health Record Incentive Programs: Final Rule, 42 CFR Parts 412, 413, 422 et al. (Washington, D.C.: 
Federal Register, 2010), 2-4. 
46 Interview with public health specialist, March 6, 2014. 
47 Interview with senior federal government official, March 20, 2014. 
48 Interview with military officer, March 3, 2014. 
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Improving the Biosurveillance System 
The task of biosurveillance can be broken down into two main components: a data 
collection and analysis element and an administrative reporting element. Classical organization 
theory advocates a centralized, vertical, bureaucratic, and rigid system to tackle simple and 
predictable environments such as the bureaucratic world of biosurveillance reporting. Conversely, 
neoclassical organization theory recommends a decentralized, flat, and flexible system to address 
unpredictable, complex environments such as the biosurveillance collection and analysis 
environment.
49
 
At present, the biosurveillance community is dominated by multiple highly specialized 
stovepipes across the federal government, all of which individually report to decisionmakers at 
the senior executive level. The problem with this stovepiped structure is twofold.  
First, the vertical stovepipes are highly parochial and poor at the interagency coordination 
and communication necessary to respond to the highly unpredictable data collection and analysis 
environment. In light of the complex and unstable biosurveillance collection and analysis 
environment, the U.S. government should promote an organizational structure with a flat, 
networked structure and a high degree of horizontal coordination at the federal operating level.
50
 
The flexibility of this organic organizational structure enables it to effectively handle the 
complex and unpredictable biosurveillance collection and analysis environment.  
Second, the lack of centralization at the agency executive level within the predictable 
administrative environment results in incomplete situational awareness.
51
 This failure to speak 
with one voice inhibits the development of coherent situational awareness at the senior executive 
level. Instead, classical organization theory’s hierarchical structure recommends consolidating 
these reporting streams into one voice. This voice provides clarity through a single, 
comprehensive situational awareness for decisionmakers. 
In essence, the structure of the biosurveillance system is ill-fitted to the environments of 
both its data collection and analysis and its administrative reporting components. It is currently 
highly fragmented in reporting and heavily vertical in collection and analysis. Thus, the 
following recommendations create a federal biosurveillance system that is horizontally 
                                                        
49 See Appendix 3 for more information on organization theory. 
50 A network is an arrangement of vertically and horizontally connected organizations sharing the same mission. The 
federal operating level is defined as the collectors, analysts, and mid-level employees at the federal level. 
51 See Appendix 2 for an interagency biosurveillance organization chart. Each of the cabinet level agencies represents a 
separate point of contact to the White House regarding biosurveillance. 
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networked at the data collection and analysis level and unified at the administrative reporting 
level. This configuration would match the structure of the biosurveillance system with its 
environment, maximizing its effectiveness. 
 
Strengthening Relationships 
The biosurveillance community suffers from weak organizational relationships between 
stovepipes. These weak relationships result in a lack of interagency trust, which inhibits 
information sharing. The development of effective exercises and the formalization of ad hoc 
working groups will strengthen these weak relationships.  
 
Recommendation: Develop Exercises Emphasizing the Role of Biosurveillance 
Improved coordination and informal relationships would increase the biosurveillance 
community’s effectiveness. Exercises can play a strong role in building capabilities and 
organizational relations, improving confidence within the biosurveillance community. At present, 
exercises generally lack a clear purpose or a focus specifically on biosurveillance.
52
 As a 
consequence, exercises become missed opportunities for building relations and capabilities. The 
biosurveillance community should increase the frequency of exercises and design them with a 
clear focus. A single agency, preferably under DHS, should develop and execute the exercises in 
order to identify and correct weaknesses. 
Exercises can also reveal flaws in the biosurveillance system. Exercises should include 
participants from across the biosurveillance system, allowing for observation of interagency 
dynamics. Difficulties in coordination should be noted and corrected. Exercises should target 
particular problems and emphasize particular skills or concepts.  
Of special interest would be exercising the concept of network-centric operations within 
the context of biosurveillance, building flexibility and effectiveness into the biosurveillance 
system.
53
 The concept of network-centric biosurveillance recognizes that agencies making up the 
federal biosurveillance system have complementary strengths and seeks to effectively coordinate 
                                                        
52 Interview with senior federal government official, April 2, 2014. 
53 Network-centric biosurveillance borrows from the military’s concept of network-centric warfare, which creates a 
networked force in order to leverage the strengths of different units, improve information sharing, and build shared situational 
awareness. The result was increased speed and lethality of U.S. forces, despite geographic dispersion. For more information on 
the concept, refer to the Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare. (Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 
The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, (Washington D.C., 2005).) 
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their activities. These exercises would promote a networked operational structure which would 
facilitate information sharing and effective interagency coordination. This operational concept 
could greatly enhance the effectiveness of federal biosurveillance.  
Exercises effectively build informal ties that strengthen biosurveillance.
54
 Firsthand 
observation of the effectiveness of other agencies builds organizational trust currently lacking in 
the system. This is especially important for NBIC, perceived by its peers as failing to add value 
in previous exercises.
55
 One of the first exercises should demonstrate NBIC’s value and 
capabilities to its partner agencies. This increased organizational trust will improve coordination 
and information sharing across the biosurveillance community. 
 
Recommendation: Formalize Ad Hoc Groups 
Another method of strengthening relationships within the biosurveillance community as a 
whole is to formalize informal relationships. The biosurveillance community currently uses 
several ad hoc working groups to coordinate policy. These groups have made a limited impact in 
addressing the problem of stovepiping; their informal and temporary nature creates doubt about 
their influence.
56
 Formalization could be accomplished by writing new policy documents or 
MOUs/MOAs. The Biosurveillance Indications and Warning Analytics Community (BIWAC) is 
the closest to this model. It began as an ad hoc working group and, although still informal, it has 
written a charter and other governing documents.
 57
 This is a step towards formalization.
 
BIWAC’s generally accepted success is a testament to benefits of this recommendation.58 By 
locking in effective working groups, formalization decreases ambiguity and enhances 
capabilities. 
 
 
                                                        
54 Andrew Card (former White House Chief of Staff), interviewed by Thomas Vien. 
55 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice, Developing a Collaboration Strategy is 
Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, by William O. Jenkins Jr., GAO-10-171 (Washington D.C., 
2009), 21. 
56 Interview with federal government employee, March 10, 2014.; Interview with senior federal government official, 
March 20, 2014. 
57 “Operational Biosurveillance: A Brief History of the Discipline,” Operational Biosurveillance, April 8, 2010, 
accessed March, 17 2014, http://biosurveillance.typepad.com/biosurveillance/2010/04/when-the-cdc-epidemic-intelligence-
service-eis-was-created-in-reaction-to-concern-about-biological-threats-during-the-korea.html.; Interview with senior federal 
government official, April 2, 2014. 
58 “Operational Biosurveillance: A Brief History of the Discipline.”; Interview with federal government employee, 
March 7, 2014. 
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Improving Governance 
At present, the federal biosurveillance system is distributed across several organizational 
stovepipes which do not communicate to decisionmakers with one voice. A consistent criticism 
is that the absence of leadership in the biosurveillance community leaves it rudderless. There are 
three recommendations to improve governance: create a lead integration center, create a unified 
policy advocate, and create a single point of contact to communicate to the senior executive level. 
NBIC is best equipped to serve as the lead integration center and BIWAC to serve as the 
interagency policy advocate. The biosurveillance community would benefit from an executive 
liaison serving as the single entity streamlining information from the integration center and 
policy center up to the White House. 
 
Recommendation: Empower NBIC 
The biosurveillance community needs to develop a network structure to maintain unified 
situational awareness. Therefore, NBIC should transition from its current analysis role to a 
coordinating role for its partner agencies. NBIC will add more value as an active coordinator of 
its partners, enabling and facilitating networked operation. The community confronts an 
unpredictable data collection and analysis environment with a diverse set of skills. If these 
strengths are properly coordinated across the community, the community will become far more 
than the sum of its parts. NBIC will enable networked operation by connecting its partners. 
These connections will also assist NBIC in providing unified situational awareness for the 
biosurveillance community. To facilitate this task, NBIC should maintain a comprehensive map 
of the entire U.S. biosurveillance community.  
This modified role must be clarified in official documents and publicized. A consistent 
criticism of NBIC by its partners is the ambiguity of its role.
59
 A good starting point would be to 
advertise its role as the preeminent integration center on the NBIC website. This information 
should also be communicated directly through memos to its partners.  
 
Recommendation: Transform BIWAC 
The biosurveillance community must build consensus and speak with a unified policy 
voice. Throughout the interviews, calls for a biosurveillance policy leader ranged from the 
                                                        
59 Developing a Collaboration Strategy is Essential to Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, 22-25. 
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Government Accountability Office (GAO) to HHS to DoD.
60
 Additionally, the interviews often 
cited BIWAC as an example of a successful interagency biosurveillance organization.
61
 Out of 
the existing biosurveillance infrastructure, BIWAC has the greatest potential to succeed as a 
unified interagency policy voice for the community.  
According to the National Biosurveillance Science and Technology Roadmap, “the 
BIWAC is a self-organized, information biosurveillance information sharing group with 
participants from multiple U.S. government organizations. The BIWAC shares biosurveillance 
data via unsophisticated web interfaces and has focused on interagency collaboration and 
relationship building.”62 It also participates in analyst-to-analyst information sharing, along with 
verification and validation of information through its portal, Wildfire, hosted by DoD. Although 
it is operationally focused it members also discuss policy.
63
 BIWAC partners include the 
intelligence community, USDA, DoD, HHS, Department of State (State), and DHS through 
NBIC.
64
 Membership has expanded through the unanimous agreement of the group and 
relationships based on strong trust between each BIWAC member. Unlike other biosurveillance 
interagency groups, BIWAC is not located under any single agency. This greatly contributes to 
its success because it has the freedom to choose its work and does not have the usual tasking 
obligations of a formal agency. It does, however, receive minimal general funding from NBIC 
and funding from the DoD’s National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) for Wildfire. 65  
BIWAC’s unique organizational characteristics and accepted success lends it to being 
transformed into an interagency policy advisory panel for the biosurveillance community. It is 
important for every biosurveillance entity and interest to be represented in the policy advisory 
panel to ensure buy-in. Human, animal, and environmental interests must be present in addition 
to man-made and naturally occurring diseases.
 66 
BIWAC meets this requirement through its 
varied member agencies, especially NBIC. Additionally, a transformed BIWAC making unified 
policy recommendations with the support of the community fulfills this requirement. BIWAC is 
                                                        
60 Interview with federal government employee, March 7, 2014.; Interview with senior federal government official, 
March 20, 2014.; Interview with public health specialist, March 3, 2014. 
61 Interview with federal government employee, March 7, 2014. 
62 Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology Council, National Biosurveillance Science and 
Technology Roadmap, Washington, D.C., 2013. 
63 Wildfire is run by the National Center for Medical Intelligence, a BIWAC member. It serves as a message board for 
BIWAC members to share unclassified biosurveillance information. (Ibid.) 
64 Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader, 81. 
65 Interview with senior federal government official, April 2, 2014. 
66 Mark Teachmann (Director of Interagency Coordination, USDA), interviewed by Lodrick Williams. 
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diverse and non-hierarchical, allowing it to effectively build consensus across stovepipes while 
speaking with one voice. The ideal policy advisory board should target the most stovepiped area, 
the federal operating level. As a group of deputies and mid-management analysts, BIWAC has a 
great chance at combatting stovepiping. BIWAC already has a positive reputation in the 
biosurveillance community and would have a stronger foundation for policy recommendations 
than a newly created entity or a completely redirected existing agency.  
Transforming BIWAC would result in several logistical challenges, but where possible an 
effort should be made not to disrupt its current successful structure. Currently BIWAC is not 
mandated through the legislative or executive branches. While BIWAC is currently informal, it 
has written a charter, strategy, and business plan.
67
 It should be formalized through a mandate 
and recognized as the policy advisory panel by all entities in the biosurveillance community. 
Much of BIWAC’s success is attributable to not being located under a single federal agency and 
should therefore remain this way. Although its policy recommendations would be expressed 
through the executive liaison, the liaison will not circumscribe BIWAC’s independence. Since 
BIWAC’s success is also attributed to its strong foundation of trust between members, new 
members should be added as the current members see fit while maintaining universal trust. 
Additionally, although it initially met three times a year, BIWAC currently meets biannually due 
to resource constraints.
68
 While acknowledging these constraints, the transformed BIWAC 
should meet at least quarterly to conduct timely analyses of current policies and issues and to 
maintain relationships. The current BIWAC does not produce official products. Instead, 
members relay its findings to their agencies. As a formal entity, BIWAC would be more public 
through means such as a website. It would also need to release its policy recommendations for 
consideration by its federal, state, and local partners. BIWAC’s mission as a predominantly 
policy-focused group would not alter its successful internal structure; its area for impact would 
just be expanded. 
BIWAC’s first policy recommendation should address calls for a universal prioritized list 
of pathogens that the entire biosurveillance community needs to report to decisionmakers. This 
list will provide additional insight on how the Nation prioritizes different biosurveillance 
                                                        
67 Interview with senior federal government official, April 2, 2014. 
68 Ibid. 
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concerns, thus indicating to the agencies where to focus and potentially redirect resources.
69
 
There are several different ways to prioritize the list, for example: where the greatest impact can 
be made without major cash flows,
70
 what are the most credible threats along with their 
probabilities,
71
 or where the greatest gaps are in the current system.
72
 Additionally, clearly 
prioritizing concerns will decrease the likelihood of overlap or duplicating efforts.
73
 Some 
agencies, such as DoD and HHS, develop their own lists of individual concerns.
74
 This proposed 
universal list should not replace, but augment the agency-specific lists. Since this list will 
indicate how to focus and direct resources, it should be located in the Implementation Plans that 
accompany subsequent National Strategies for Biosurveillance. BIWAC should regularly 
reevaluate the universal prioritized list and recommend potential changes. This universal 
prioritized list will help clarify and direct agencies to focus their efforts accordingly. 
 
Recommendation: Establish an Executive Liaison for Biosurveillance 
The biosurveillance community needs to transmit a clear and cohesive message to 
decisionmakers. An executive liaison for the biosurveillance community would serve as the 
principal conduit between the White House and the biosurveillance community. The liaison will 
receive information from the integration center, NBIC, and the policy advisory center, BIWAC. 
The creation of this position elevates the status of NBIC by the liaison exclusively 
communicating with NBIC for complete situational awareness. BIWAC’s profile will also 
increase by producing policy recommendations for the liaison. The liaison would be a permanent 
member of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff and the official title would be Special 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Biosurveillance.
75
 This position would not have 
any authority to task the biosurveillance community, but instead transmit the information 
produced by the community.  
                                                        
69 Interview with former military officer, March 3, 2014.; John Wade (Vice President and General Manager, Life 
Sciences Research Business Unit), interviewed by Thomas Vien. 
70 Interview with public health specialist, March 3, 2014. 
71 Interview with former military officer, March 3, 2014.; John Wade (Vice President and General Manager, Life 
Sciences Research Business Unit), interviewed by Thomas Vien. 
72 Interview with military officer, March 7, 2014. 
73 Interview with federal government employees, March 10, 2014.; Interview with former military officer, March 3, 
2014.; John Wade (Vice President and General Manager, Life Sciences Research Business Unit), interviewed by Thomas Vien. 
74 Interview with biosurveillance expert, March 7, 2014. 
75 This would be similar to the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense proposed in H.R. 4034 by the House of 
Representatives. (WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2014, H.R. 4034, 113th Cong., § 101, 103 (2014).) 
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As an example of how this report envisions the implementation of these 
recommendations, consider the case of a West Nile incident. Both the animal and human 
biosurveillance collectors would identify the ongoing outbreak. They would communicate 
information up their respective stovepipes and to the appropriate interagency hubs, in particular 
NBIC. NBIC would then communicate the information about the outbreak to the executive 
liaison. Once the executive liaison has complete situational awareness from NBIC, it will 
provide the information to decisionmakers at the senior executive level to determine the 
appropriate response and the corresponding lead agency. Following the event, BIWAC would 
review all actions taken and provide the liaison with appropriate policy recommendations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
At present, there is no unified situational awareness available to decisionmakers due to 
difficulties in collecting data from stakeholders and communicating analyses between agencies. 
Current integration efforts have been insufficient. The system needs to be reorganized to fulfill 
the Strategy’s goal of providing a timely warning to save lives. This research identified concerns 
regarding data collection, relationships, and the governance of the biosurveillance community. 
The biosurveillance system has continually improved since its inception; however, until the 
recommendations enclosed in this report are addressed, decisionmakers will be unable to make 
fully informed decisions regarding biological incidents.  
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Appendix 1: Definitions 
 
 Advise: To offer suggestions about the best course of current or future action using 
forecasts. 
 Alert: To make aware or transmit a warning of a possible danger. 
 Biosurveillance Community: The individuals and agencies involved in biosurveillance. 
 Biosurveillance Infrastructure: The stovepipes through which collectors and analysts 
work. 
 Biosurveillance System: Overarching term that includes both the biosurveillance 
community and the biosurveillance infrastructure. 
 Discern: To distinguish the existence of a threat that requires further identification by 
analyzing the quality, quantity, and geographical spread of scanned data. 
 Federal Operating Level: The collectors, analysts, and mid-level employees at the 
federal level. 
 Forecast: To predict or estimate current or future incidents using indicators, models, and 
expertise. 
 Identify: To determine which information and data streams will be used to formulate 
analyses. 
 Integrate: To share relevant data and analyzed information within and between agencies. 
 Inform: To impart awareness of facts or knowledge about a situation. 
 Network: An arrangement of vertically and horizontally connected organizations sharing 
the same mission. 
 Scan: To actively and purposefully gather data across geographic and subject matter 
areas. 
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Appendix 2: Biosurveillance Community Organization Chart 
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Appendix 3: Organization Theory 
 
Basic structural organization theory informed relationship and governance 
recommendations in this report. Structural theories can be broken into two schools: classical and 
neoclassical. These theories were combined with an analysis of environment complexity and 
stability to determine the most effective organizational structure for the biosurveillance system. 
Classical organization theory emphasizes top-down, mechanistic structures. Mechanistic 
organizational structures are centralized and have rigid vertical hierarchies. They have highly 
specialized parts performing smaller tasks that are abstracted from the overall goal (such as 
assembly line workers who tighten bolts on a car). Coordination in classical mechanistic systems 
is accomplished through standardization and direct supervision, and communication follows 
vertical lines. Mechanistic structures are best at performing simple, routine tasks in a reliable 
manner and in a predictable environment.
76
 
Neoclassical organization theory stresses bottom-up, organic structures. Organic 
structures’ decentralization and networked structure lack rigid hierarchies. When tackling 
problems, components of the network become “ad hoc centers of control authority and 
communication” based on particular expertise in addressing the issue at hand, while other 
components play supporting roles. Organizations in the network coordinate informally and 
communicate horizontally. Organic systems excel at the innovation needed for sophisticated 
tasks.
77
 
 Classical mechanistic structure and neoclassical organic structure represent two extremes 
on a spectrum of organizational configurations. Most organizations lie somewhere in the middle. 
The level of uncertainty in an organization’s enviornment determines an organizations’ optimum 
configuration. Recommendations of this report used the 2x2 framework in Figure 1 to assess 
environmental uncertainty along two dimensions: the simple-complex dimension and the stable-
unstable dimension. The simple-complex dimension refers to the number and dissimilarity of 
external factors in the environment.
78
 The stable-unstable dimension refers to the volatility or 
                                                        
76 Burns, Tom, and G.M. Stalker, "Mechanistic and Organic Systems," in Classics of Organization Theory, ed. J. 
Steven Ott Jay M. Shafritz, Yong Suk Jang (Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011), 201. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Daft, Richard L., Organization Theory and Design, 10th ed.: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2008, 147-148. 
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predictability of the environment.
79
 Figure 1 provides a comprehensive description of the types 
of environments. 
Figure 1. Environmental Uncertainty 
 
 Based on this framework, the researchers found that biosurveillance data collection and 
analysis operates in a complex, unstable environment (bottom-right quadrant). On the other hand, 
the administrative reporting component takes place in a simple, stable environment (top-left 
quadrant). Figure 2 prescribes the organizational structures best fitted to each environment: 
                                                        
79 Ibid, 147-148. 
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Figure 2. Structural Prescriptions 
 
 Based on Figure 2, the complex and unstable environment of biosurveillance data 
collection and analysis demands the flexibility of a neoclassical structure at the federal operating 
level (bottom-right quadrant). This environment should have a networked, decentralized 
structure with many integrating roles. Conversely, the simple and stable administrative reporting 
environment implies that the biosurveillance reporting structure would benefit from a simple and 
centralized structure (top-left quadrant). This simple, centralized structure would be able to 
report clearly and reliably. 
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Information Memorandum 
 
 Biological incidents, both man-made and naturally occurring, represent a significant 
threat to the national security of the United States. Identifying these crises begins with the 
detection and reporting of essential biological disease information, known as biosurveillance. As 
the first of its kind, the 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance’s goal is “to achieve a well-
integrated national biosurveillance enterprise that saves lives by providing essential information 
for better decisionmaking at all levels.”80 This report asks: Is the current approach for the 
National Strategy for Biosurveillance conducive to meeting its desired endstate? If not, where 
does it need adjustment? To answer these questions, this report examined the Strategy, evaluated 
its implementation, and recommended policies for improving the national biosurveillance 
infrastructure. 
At present, the Strategy does not have guidelines to provide complete situational 
awareness for decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Moreover, the Strategy’s ambiguity inhibits 
cohesive implementation throughout the community. Given the current environment, this report 
targets concerns relating to data incorporation, relationships, and governance.  
To improve the current biosurveillance infrastructure, this report presents 
recommendations for the identified concerns. Addressing the data incorporation concern, the 
acquisition of human health data to the biosurveillance community should be expanded by 
standardizing all electronic health records. Consequently, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) should establish a working group to standardize private and public human health 
records, reflecting current privacy requirements. Additionally, animal and plant contributors are 
hesitant to report data, fearing negative economic effects if the shared data were leaked or 
prematurely released to the public. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) need legislation protecting commercial contributors’ 
anonymity to assuage confidentiality concerns. 
Organization theory framed the recommendations addressing the relationships and 
governance concerns. At present, the biosurveillance community is dominated by multiple highly 
specialized stovepipes across the federal government, all of which individually report to 
                                                        
80 Executive Office of the President, The White House, National Strategy for Biosurveillance, (Washington, D.C., 
2012), 1. 
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decisionmakers at the senior executive level. The problem with this stovepiped structure is 
twofold. First, the vertical stovepipes are highly parochial and poor at the interagency 
coordination and communication necessary to respond to the highly unpredictable data collection 
and analysis environment. This demands the flexibility of a neoclassical structure at the federal 
operating level.
81
 This environment should have a networked, decentralized structure with many 
integrating roles. Second, the lack of centralization at the agency executive level within the 
predictable administrative environment results in incomplete situational awareness.
82
 This 
implies that the biosurveillance reporting structure would benefit from a simple and centralized 
structure. This simple, centralized structure would be able to report clearly and reliably. 
The lack of interagency communication resulting from weak relationships hinders 
effective biosurveillance. Increased exercises with a clear focus would build capabilities and 
organizational relations, improving confidence within the biosurveillance community. DHS 
would likely lead these exercises. Increased interaction between agencies will help them identify 
weaknesses in coordination and test new operational concepts that can effectively integrate the 
entire community. To further improve communication between all agencies, existing ad hoc 
working groups should be formalized through policy documents or MOUs/MOAs. Formalization 
would decrease ambiguity in responsibilities and lock in effective working groups. 
Currently, the agency stovepipes do not communicate to decisionmakers with one voice. 
There are three recommendations to improve governance: create a lead integration center, create 
a unified policy advocate, and create a single point of contact to communicate to the senior 
executive level. The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) is best equipped to 
serve as the lead integration center, and the Biosurveillance Indications and Warnings Analytic 
Community (BIWAC) to serve as the interagency policy advocate. The biosurveillance 
community would benefit from an executive liaison serving as the single entity streamlining 
information from the integration center and policy center up to the White House. 
The biosurveillance community needs to develop a network structure to maintain unified 
situational awareness.
83
 Therefore, NBIC should transition from its current analysis role to a 
coordinating role for its partner agencies. NBIC will add more value as an active coordinator of 
                                                        
81 Federal operating level is defined as the collectors, analysts, and mid-level employees at the federal level. 
82 See biosurveillance organization chart. Each one of the cabinet level agencies sitting at the top of the stovepipes 
represents a separate point of contact to the White House regarding biosurveillance. 
83 Network is defined as an arrangement of vertically and horizontally connected organizations sharing the same 
mission. 
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its partners, enabling and facilitating networked operation. This modified role must be clarified 
in official documents and publicized. Additionally, the biosurveillance community must build 
consensus and speak with a unified policy voice. Out of the existing biosurveillance 
infrastructure, BIWAC has the greatest potential to succeed in this role due to its unique 
organizational characteristics and accepted success by members of the biosurveillance 
community. A transformed BIWAC would release its policy recommendations for consideration 
by its federal, state, and local partners.  
Finally, the biosurveillance community needs to transmit a clear and cohesive message to 
decisionmakers. An executive liaison for the biosurveillance community, located on the National 
Security Council (NSC) Staff, would serve as the principal conduit between the White House 
and the biosurveillance community. The liaison will receive information from the integration 
center, NBIC, and the policy advisory center, BIWAC. This position would not have any 
authority to task the biosurveillance community, but instead would only transmit the information 
produced by the community to senior decisionmakers. 
 The biosurveillance system has continually improved since its inception; however, until 
the recommendations enclosed in this report are addressed, decisionmakers will be unable to 
make fully informed decisions regarding biological incidents. 
